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The Money Mule: Its Discursive
Construction and the Implications
Rainer Hiulsse*
ABSTRACT
The proceeds of cybercrime are typically laundered by money
mules-people used by criminal organizations to interrupt the
financial paper trail by transfering money for the criminals.
This Article analyzes the discursive construction of the money
mule in documents of national and international anti-money
laundering authorities such as Financial Intelligence Units
(FIUs), Europol, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
It shows how case study narratives, visualizations, and
metaphors contribute to an understanding of the money mule as
an innocent victim of organized crime networks from West
Africa and Eastern Europe, supported by money remittance
companies like Western Union. These constructions have several
implications: First, they make awareness-raising campaigns the
key policy response "at home" (i.e., in countries in the North and
West). Second, they imply a policy reaction of playing tough
with "sovereigns on the margins of the law" deemed "abroad"
(i.e., countries in the South and East). And third, they direct
blame and responsibility towards financial transmitters, but
they let banks get away.
* Rainer Hillsse is a Senior Lecturer at the Geschwister-Scholl Institute of Political
Science at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universithit in Munich, Germany. His research
focuses on issues of international politics such as money laundering, global governance,
and the role of language in politics. Dr. Hillsse has published several articles on the
Financial Action Task Force Against Money-Laundering (FATF). Thanks to comments
on a previous version of this Article by participants in the Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law Symposium on "Sovereign Conduct on the Margins of the Law"
held at Vanderbilt Law School on February 17, 2017.
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I. INTRODUCTION
According to law enforcement authorities, the proceeds of
cybercrime are typically laundered by so-called money mules, used by
cybercriminals to break the paper trail of money stolen from people's
bank accounts or credit cards through Internet fraud such as
phishing. The criminals normally recruit money mules in Western
countries so that they do not have to transfer the stolen money
directly to their own bank accounts, as this would make it rather easy
for law enforcement to discover the beneficiaries. Often, at least
according to the sources examined here, the money mules do not
know that they are part of a criminal operation, as they have replied
to fake job offers or scam emails, which make them believe they work
as "financial agents" for legitimate companies. The criminals transfer
the proceeds of their crime to their "financial agents' bank accounts
and then ask them to withdraw the money and pay it to a money
transmitter like Western Union or MoneyGram, to transfer it to the
criminals in Eastern Europe or West Africa. For his or her services,
the money mule receives a commission.
This Article takes issue with the role of the money mule in
international money laundering. However, instead of addressing the
topic from an objectivist and positivist perspective which seeks to
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identify the principle facts, variables, and causal mechanisms, the
Article looks at the money mule from the inter-subjectivist and post-
positivist perspective of discourse analysis. The goal of such a
discourse approach is to understand how what is considered the
taken-for-granted reality (here, of money laundering) has been
constituted in discourse.
The first Part of the Article reconstructs the international
discourse about the money mule in order to identify the content of the
mule-constructions: How is the money mule process constituted in
discourse? The money mule is typically characterized as an innocent
victim who is not aware of the criminal nature of what he or she is
doing but simply wants to earn some extra money. The criminals,
according to the discourse, are not some petty criminals, but members
of complex networks of organized crime. The criminal organizations
are directed either from Eastern Europe, notably Russia or Ukraine,
or from West Africa, especially from Nigeria. As the money is sent
there via money remittance companies like Western Union, these
companies constitute part of the problem.
The second Part of the Article reconstructs the discourse with a
view to understanding the discursive mechanisms which establish the
money mule reality: What are the discursive mechanisms through
which the money mule is constituted? Here, narratives,
visualizations, and metaphors bring about the money mule reality:
rather than offering only dry numbers and abstract descriptions,
reports of FIUs and other actors make use of narratives so that the
money mule case studies they present almost read like crime
thrillers. Also, pictures, photographs, and figures help one see and
understand what money mules do and who they are, and so do the
different metaphors which structure the discourse, most obviously the
mule metaphor, but also metaphors like phishing and orchestration.
The third Part of the Article inquires into the effects of these
constructions, assuming that they make possible certain kinds of
policies while excluding others, as certain measures appear normal in
the light of the above constructions, whereas others are virtually
unthinkable. Which (policy) reactions do the money mule
constructions make possible, and which become impossible? The
construction of the money mule as an innocent victim directs anti-
money laundering towards public awareness-raising campaigns,
while making it difficult to articulate policies which seek to deter the
money mule through harsh penalties. Also, the construction of the
money transmitter companies as quasi-accomplices of cybercriminal
networks enables anti-money laundering measures targeted against
these companies, whereas banks do not play much of a role in the
fight against money-muling. And finally, the construction of Western
Africa and Eastern Europe as the home bases of cybercriminals
brings about anti-money laundering policies that seek to rule out
money laundering in these places rather than in the West-although
20171 Ioo9
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one can hardly claim that countries in the North and West,
Switzerland for example, are immune to money laundering.
The approach of this Article is based on post-structuralist
discourse theory and method, which enjoy considerable popularity in
the discipline of International Relations (IR), though arguably more
among European than American IR scholars. In particular, this
Article builds on authors who have argued that discursive
mechanisms such as narratives,' pictures,2 and metaphors3 should
come under scrutiny, because one can only understand how exactly
reality is being made, if one studies the precise discursive means of
reality production.4 While methodological rigor is a stranger to
poststructuralism-some proponents of discourse analysis even claim
that it is an attitude rather than a method-it is important to make
transparent what this Article is doing. Most importantly, to clarify
the sources used for this discourse analysis: this Article focuses on
official discourse, including not only documents published by
international organisations such as the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF), the FATF-style regional body MONEYVAL, or the EU law
enforcement agency Europol, but also of national authorities like
FIUs or the police. This Article also includes statements and
interviews by officials of the above organizations. When talking about
documents, this not only includes written documents such as typology
reports or annual reports (though they are principal sources), but also
educational videos published by law enforcement agencies or posters
and flyers by these same actors.
As far as the time frame of the analysis is concerned, this Article
goes back as far as possible, in annual reports for example, to find out
when the money mule first entered the discursive stage. Research
revealed it was around the year 2005 that the money mule first
appeared in official documents.
With regard to geographical focus, this Article focuses on how
the money mule is constructed in the OECD world-that is, in
1. See generally ALEXANDER SPENCER, ROMANTIC NARRATIVES IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: PIRATES, REBELS AND MERCENARIES (2016).
2. See generally David Campbell, Geopolitics and Visuality: Sighting the
Darfur Conflict, 26 POL. GEOGRAPHY 357 (2007), http://www.sciencedirect.com.
proxy.library.vanderbilt.edulscience/article/piilS0962629806001466
[http://perma.cc/9LZB-S34K] (archived Aug. 29, 2017); Lene Hansen, How Images
Make World Politics: International Icons and the Case of Abu Ghraib, 41 REV. INT'L
STUD. 263 (2015), http://proxy.1ibrary.vanderbilt.edulmenu [https://perma.cc/PFY9-
AGDD] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
3. See generally Rainer Hillsse & Alexander Spencer, The Metaphor of Terror:
Terrorism Studies and the Constructivist Turn, 39 SECURITY DIALOGUE 571 (2008),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249687972_TheMetaphorof
TerrorTerrorismStudies-andtheConstructivistTurn [https://perma.cclH2PV-
9XT2] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
4. See Jennifer Milliken, The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A
Critique of Research and Method, 5 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 225 (1999).
[VOL.5o:Joo71010
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countries of the North and the West. Therefore, this Article only
covers FIU reports of countries like Switzerland and Germany, not of
Ghana or Guatemala (which normally do not publish such reports
anyway), and of international organizations that are firmly rooted in
the Western hemisphere like Europol or FATF, the latter having
started out as a club-organization set up by the United States.5
Within IR, there is now a considerable body of literature on
money laundering, most of which focuses on the global governance of
anti-money laundering.6 Whereas some authors focus more on
international organizations like FATF,'7 others are interested mainly
in those countries which are hesitant with regards to the
implementation of anti-money laundering regulation.8 There is also
IR literature on organized crime, including cybercrime.9 The role of
money mules, however, remains largely unexplored, not only for IR,
but for the social sciences more generally, where work on money
mules or physical cash smuggling more broadly is the rare
exception.10
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows: The next
Part reconstructs the content of the money mule discourse, i.e., the
principal constructions of the money mule process (Part II). In the
subsequent step, the Article examines the discursive mechanisms
through which these constructions are established (Part III), before
turning to the possible effects of the money mule discourse (Part IV).
In the Conclusion, the Article briefly discusses how the money mule
could become such a big issue in anti-money laundering circles (Part
V).
5. See Rainer Hillsse, Even Clubs Can't Do Without Legitimacy: Why the Anti-
Money Laundering Blacklist Was Suspended, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 459, 460 (2008),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10. 1111/j.1748-5991.2008.00046.x/epdf
[http://perma.ccLUL5Q-EJ9V] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
6. See, e.g., J.C. SHARMAN, THE MONEY LAUNDRY: REGULATING CRIMINAL
FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2011).
7. See, e.g., Rainer Hilsse & Dieter Kerwer, How International Organizations
Rule the World: The Case of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, 2
INT'L ORG. STUD. 50 (2011), http://journal-iostudies.org/sites/journal-
iostudies.org/files/JIOS201121final_5.pdf [https://perma.cclE8N4-DJ78] (archived Aug.
29, 2017).
8. See, e.g., J.C. Sharman, Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-
Money Laundering in Developing States, 52 INT'L STUD. Q. 635 (2008),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfl29734254.pdfrefreqid=excelsior:445177bdc354bd9a264
da04llb4e7Od8&seq=1#page-scantab-contents [https://perma.ccl7XRZ-KXLQI
(archived Aug. 29, 2017).
9. See, e.g., ANJA P. JAKOBI, COMMON GOODS AND EVILS? THE FORMATION OF
GLOBAL CRIME GOVERNANCE (2013).
10. See Rutger Leukfeldt & Jurjen Jansen, Cyber Criminal Networks and
Money Mules: An Analysis of Low-Tech and High-Tech Fraud Attacks in the
Netherlands, 9 INT'L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 173, 174 (2015),
http://www.cybercrimejournal.com/Leukfeldt&Jansen20l5vol9issue2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/69HZ-GHRI] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
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II. THE REALITY CONSTITUTED BY THE DISCOURSE (CONTENT)
This Part reconstructs the money mule discourse in order to
identify its principle constructions. It begins with the key figure,
namely the money mule, then looks at the criminal that stands
behind the mule, and finally reconstructs the role of financial
institutions.
A. The Money Mule
Who are the money mules who are portrayed as vulnerable
targets of criminals? According to the principle narrative, the typical
mule is a young male person in a Western/Northern country, looking
for extra income. Often the mule is a student, who is tricked by
criminals and therefore not aware of having committed a crime. The
mule is constructed as an innocent victim rather than a criminal. The
following paragraphs look at these constructions in more detail.
Whereas the criminals behind the mules are said to reside
abroad, the mule is normally from a developed country in the
North/West." And, typically, the mule is portrayed as a white
person.12 In the case studies by the Swiss FIU, the mule is almost
always a Swiss national,'3 and Europol illustrates the money mule
11. However, a Moneyval report claims that this is a recent development, as
money mules used to be mostly from less developed countries. See MONEYVAL,
Criminal Money Flows on the Internet: Methods, TRends and Multi-stakeholder
Counteraction, COUNCIL OF EUR. 1, 49 (2012), https://rm.coe.int/research-report-
criminal-money-flows-on-the-internet-methods-trends-an/1680 71509a (last visited
June 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc[MU6X-AEXfl (archived Aug. 29, 2017). Also, evidence
by the Swiss FIU sheds doubt on the money mule being an innocent Westerner, given
that in one year 1/4 of all convicted money mules came from Western Africa, and 61%
from Nigeria. See Bundesamt far Polizei/fedpol, Geldwischerei, Geldwdscheurteile in
der Schweiz 5 (2014),
https://www.fedpol.admin.ch/dam/data/fedpol/kriminalitaet/geldwaescherei/geldwaesch
ereiurteile-d.pdf (last visited June 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5J2B-U45G] (archived
Aug. 29, 2017). And yet, the dominant picture given in the discourse is that of the mule
being from the NorthlWest.
12. See Polizei Niedersachsen, Ratgeber Internetkriminalitdt, Video Podcast
Nr. 3 - Finanzagent-Unseribse Job-Angebote, https://www.polizei-praevention.de/
downloads.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2017) [https://perma.cc/88VP-R4JJ] (archived Aug.
29, 2017); Europol, Money Muling: Public Awareness and Prevention, EUROPOL (2016),
https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/public-awareness-and-prevention-
guides/money-muling (last visited June 14, 2017) (https://perma.cc/9LFT-AZLH]
(archived Aug. 29, 2017).
13. E.g., MROS, Annual Report by the Money Laundering Reporting Office
Switzerland 2013, FEDERAL OFFICE OF POLICE 1, 49 (2013),
https://www.fedpol.admin.ch/dam/datalfedpol/kriminalitaet/geldwaeschereijabe/jb.
mros-2013-e.pdf (last visited June 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/NS8E-VUAE] (archived
Aug. 29, 2017) [MROS 2013].
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process in a chart that describes three mules, all of whom hold
accounts in EU countries.14
Moreover, the mule is portrayed as a person seeking extra income.
Three groups of people stand out as particularly vulnerable due to
their precarious economic statuses: First, senior citizens, as they not
only may need some extra money but also supposedly are less capable
of handling spam email. In many of the case studies presented in
official documents, the money mule is a retired person.5 Second,
students are the targets most often referred to. They often search for
jobs and may therefore look at the fake-job advertisements the
criminals use to try to hire mules. In this vein, Europol not only
mentions students as an important target group, but also on its
posters displays pictures of young people that look like students.16
Third, migrants and refugees are also said to be likely mules. This is
due not only to the fact that they are typically economically
underprivileged, but also to the fact that they are unfamiliar with the
judicial system of their host countries, especially when they have only
just arrived.'7 Also, they are in particular danger of becoming mules
because they may be approached from criminals from their own
communities and because they are familiar with financial
transmitters such as Western Union, as they use these to send money
home to their families.
Young people are held to be more likely to be used as mules than
older people. Europol makes this explicit when it claims that the
typical mule is eighteen to thirty-four years old.' 8 This is underlined
by most of the visual data analyzed, where young people also figure
most prominently.'9 This is hardly surprising, given the fact that
14. See Europol, Why is Cash Still King? A Strategic Report on the Use of Cash
by Criminal Groups as a Facilitator for Money Laundering, EUROPOL (2015),
https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/why-cash-still-king-strategic-
report-use-of-cash-criminal-groups-facilitator-for- money-laundering (last visited June
14, 2017) [http://perma.cc/A2DA-KSEP] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Europol,
Why is Cash Still King?].
15. E.g., ACCC, Targeting Scams: Report of the ACCC on scams activity 2015,
ACCC (2016), https://www.accc.gov.aulsystem/files/Targeting%20scams%20-
%20report%20of/o2Othe%20ACCC%20on%20scam%20activity%202015.pdf (last visited
June 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/74J8-P6W5] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
16. See Europol, Money Muling Posters, EUROPOL (2016),
https://www.europol.europa.eulpublications-documents/money-mule-posters (last
visited June 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/HH3U-NB76] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
17. See Europol, Money Muling: Public Awareness and Prevention, supra note
12; see also THOMAS HEILMANN, BERLIN SENATOR OF JUSTICE, quoted in DER
TAGESSPIEGEL, WIE KRIMINELLE UNBEDARFTE BEI GELDWASCHE EINSPANNEN (Feb. 20,
2016), http://www.tagesspiegel.de/wirtschaft/vorsicht-scheingeschaefte-wie-kriminelle-
unbedarfte-bei-geldwaesche-einspannen/12990218.html (last visited June 14, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/K4WG-KC6Q] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
18. See Europol, Money Muling Flyers, EUROPOL (2016),
https://www.europol.europa.eulpublications-documents/money-mule-flyers (last visited
June 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/QR5J-VCHD] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
19. See Polizei Niedersachsen, supra note 12.
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students are singled out as the most likely target group of money
launderers.
The gender of the money mule is rarely made an explicit issue.
The exception is Europol, which writes that mules are predominantly
male.2 0 Gathering from pictures and videos which form part of the
discourse, the mule seems more likely to be male than female.21
Typically, money mules are portrayed as "ordinary everyday
citizens"2 2 unaware of being part of a criminal operation.23 The mule
transfers money through his or her account believing that this is
"part of the job" 24; after all he or she has been hired by a company as
a "financial manager." Hence the money mules are "unsuspecting
account-holder[s]"2 5 or "credulous individual[s]," 26 and-most often-
they are "innocent victims,"27 "misused"2 8 by "fraudulent criminal
organisations,"29 which "dupe"30 them into money laundering.
However, while the "innocent victim" is clearly the dominant
narrative, it does not go entirely uncontested. Moneyval, for example,
declares it a "naive image" now questioned by the police and by
banks, as they have experienced "numerous instances where it
became apparent that the mule was fully aware of the illegal nature
of his/her deeds."3 1 A report by Swiss law enforcement authorities
20. See Europol, Money Muling: Public Awareness and Prevention, supra note
12. 1
21. See Europol, Money Muling Posters, supra note 16; Polizei Niedersachsen,
supra note 12.
22. See Tasmania Police, Woman charged with money mule offences, TASMANIA
POLICE (Feb. 20, 2016), http://www.police.tas.gov.aulnews-events/media-
releases/woman-charged-with-money mule-offences/ (last visited June 14, 2017)
[https://perma.ce/6XGZ-S9Y5] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
23. See, e.g., MROS 2013, supra note 13, at 46 (providing case studies); MROS,
Annual Report by the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland MROS 2015,
FEDERAL OFFICE OF POLICE 1, 46 (2016), https://www.fedpol.admin.ch/
damldata/fedpol/kriminalitaet/geldwaeschereiljabe/jb-mros-2013-e.pdf (last visited
June 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8C92-PTGH] [hereinafter MROS 2015]; US-CERT,
Understanding and Protecting Yourself Against Money Mule Schemes, US-CERT (2011),
https://www.us-cert.gov/security-publications/understanding-and-protecting-yourself-
against-money-mule-schemes (last visited June 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9RZF-NMS2]
(archived Aug. 29, 2017).
24. See Europol, Money Muling Posters, supra note 16.
25. "Finanzagenten" Gesucht: Stellenangebot mit Folgen, http://www.polizei-
beratung.de/themen-und-tipps/betrug/finanzagenten.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/P4ST-CQRK] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
26. MONEYVAL, supra note 11, at 48.
27. Europol, Money Muling Posters, supra note 16.
28. MROS, Annual Report by the Money Laundering Reporting Office
Switzerland MROS 2007, FEDERAL OFFICE OF POLICE 68 (2008),
https://www.fedpol.admin.ch/dam/data/fedpol/kriminalitaet/geldwaeschereiljabe/jb-
mros-2007-e.pdf (last visited June 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/J35X-XE24] (archived
Aug. 29, 2017) [hereinafter MROS 2007].
29. See id.
30. See Europol, Money Muling Posters, supra note 16.
31. MONEYVAL, supra note 11, at 48.
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claims that it has become a challenge for criminals to find people
naive enough to be recruited as mules.32
B. The Criminal Behind the Mule
Having reconstructed the making of the money mule, one now
turns to the criminals behind the mule. Who are they? How are they
organized? Where are they from? What is their background? In the
following paragraphs, this Article will show that typically they are
cybercriminals who have stolen money through Internet fraud,
especially phishing. They belong to well-organized criminal networks,
from either Eastern Europe or Western Africa. Yet, their education
seems to be rather basic, given the poor language in their recruitment
emails.33
The money mule typically launders money that results from
cybercrime. In a 2016 Europol operation against money mules, for
example, 90 percent of the money mule transactions discovered were
linked to cybercrime.34 The cybercrime practice most often mentioned
in relation to money mules is phishing, where criminals manage to
hack the bank account of their victims and then transfer money from
that account to the mule's bank account.3 5
The analyzed reports emphasize that contrary to what one would
expect: it is not petty criminals but complex criminal organizations
that are behind the money mule. As the president of Eurojust puts it:
"It is important to understand that money laundering may on the
surface seem to be a small crime, but is orchestrated by organised
crime groups."36 Europol, for example, describes the structure of one
criminal network, where an "aggregator" collects the money of several
mules, then transfers the money to a "mastermind," who pays the
32. Melani, Informationssicherung. Lage in der Schweiz und International.
Halbjahresbericht 2016/1 (JANUAR-JUNI) 41 (2016),
https://www.melani.admin.ch/melani/...Ihalbjahresbericht-2016-1.html (last visited
June 14, 2017) [https://perma.cclK8T9-JPYJ] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
33. Brooke S. Charles, The Most Common Schemes for Targeting the
Unknowing Money Mule, SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (Sep. 16, 2014),
https://securityintelligence.com/the-most-common-schemes-for-targeting-the-
unknowing-money-mule/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9NRH-CD7T]
(archived Aug. 29, 2017) (noting that the recruitment emails have poor grammar).
34. See Press Release, Europol, Europe-Wide Action Targets Money Mule
Schemes (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.europol.europa.eulnewsroom/news/europe-wide-
action-targets-money-mule-schemes (last visited June 14, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/P4GP-BGTD] (archived Aug. 28, 2017).
35. Europol, Money Muling: Public Awareness and Prevention, supra note 12;
MROS 2015, supra note 23, at 14.
36. John Leyden, 178 Arrested in Pan-European Money Mule Crackdown, THE
REGISTER (Nov. 22, 2016, 12:59 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/11/22/
european money mule-crackdown (last visited Feb. 7, 7.2.2017)
[https://perma.c/88EM-6KZ5] (archived Aug. 28, 2017) (quoting Michle Coninsx).
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cybercriminal.3 7 Moneyval talks about money mules being
"orchestrated by large organised crime networks," which are managed
by a "central data manager."3 8
The reports also discuss the origin of the criminals behind the
money mule and find two main regions where the criminals are
based: Eastern Europe and West Africa. Eastern Europe is said to be
the home of many cybercriminals, and therefore money mules are
frequently linked to this region. The Swiss FIU, for example,
discovered that a Swiss mule has transferred money to "Eastern
Europe,"3 9 and so has Moneyval.40 Particular countries are also being
named, most often Russia and Ukraine,4 1 but Czechia, Tajikistan,
and Moldova are also on the list.42 Europol even finds a hierarchy
with the above-cited "aggregator" of the money laundered by mules
sitting in Ukraine, whereas the "mastermind" resides in Russia and
the "cybercriminal" working for him is based in China.4 3 However,
China is otherwise rarely mentioned when it comes to the
phenomenon of money mules. Instead, the Chinese seem to be leading
figures in physical cash transport.44
Africa, especially Western Africa, is the other world region
described as the home of the criminal organizations behind the money
mules. The Annual Reports of the Swiss FIU, for example, reference
not only Africa 45 and "African fraudsters,"46 but also "West Africa."47
However, it is almost one country only that is being mentioned in this
respect, namely Nigeria. For example, the US National Risk
Assessment argues that "Nigerian criminal enterprises are among
the most aggressive and expansionist of the international criminal
groups . . . infamous for their financial frauds."48
37. Europol, Why is Cash Still King?, supra note 14, at 41.
38. MONEYVAL, supra note 11, at 50.
39. MROS 2007, supra note 28, at 68.
40. MONEYVAL, supra note 11, at 50.
41. Bundesamt far Polizeilfedpol, supra note 11, at 6.
42. MONEYVAL, supra note 11, at 49.
43. Europol, Why is Cash Still King?, supra note 14, at 41.
44. Id.
45. MROS, Annual Report by the Money Laundering Reporting Office
Switzerland MROS 2012, FEDERAL OFFICE OF POLICE 41 (2012),
https://www.fedpol.admin.ch/dam/data/fedpol/kriminalitaet/geldwaescherei/jabe/jb-
mros-2012-e.pdf (last visited June 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/BJ7Z-3REZ] (archived
Aug. 28, 2017) [hereinafter MROS 2012].
46. MROS 2013, supra note 13, at 50.
47. MROS 2015, supra note 23, at 47.
48. Adam J. Szubin, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING
RISK ASSESSMENT 2015, at 18 (2015), https://www.treasury.gov/ resource-
center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/National%20Money%20
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C. The Financial Institutions
The credulous mules are misused by Eastern European or
Western African criminal organizations. The mules receive stolen
money in their bank accounts and are then asked to withdraw it and
send it to the criminal organization. How so? In almost every account
of money laundering through money mules, the mule transfers the
money to the criminals by using a money remittance company such as
Western Union. This subpart reconstructs this linkage of the mule to
the money transmitter.
One of the most striking features of the money mule discourse is
the omnipresence of money transmitters. While the money mule
normally receives the stolen money in his/her bank account, banks no
longer play a role after the mule's cash withdrawal from that account.
In order to transfer the money to his or her "employer," using the
services of money transmitters is "by far the best established money
mule modus operandi."49 The main advantage of these companies is
said to be the fact that they provide a relatively anonymous
transaction process that enables the criminals to break the paper
trail. "Because of the nature of the money remittance industry, a
transaction-based system is in place meaning there is no 'long term'
customer relationship, and few details around a customer are kept."
50 This kind of money transfer is also described as cheaper and faster
than regular banking, apart from the fact that the criminal
organizations often reside in countries with underdeveloped banking
systems.51
The one company that almost stands as a synonym for money
transmitters is Western Union. The company is a well-known brand,
and one police video analyzed showed the money mule carrying the
money to a branch of Western Union.52 Official reports, too, are quite
explicit: Europol, for example, finds that for money transfer "most
commonly Western Union, but also MoneyGram, Web Money, PayPal,
Ukash"5 3 are being used. The Swiss FIU, to name another example,
makes explicit mention of Western Union and MoneyGram.54 Hence,
while Western Union has almost become a synonym for money
transmitters, there are also other companies providing similar
services.
49. Europol, Why is Cash Still King?, supra note 14, at 41; see also MROS
2015, supra note 23, at 46-47; "ARnanzagenten" Gesucht, supra note 25 ("[T]he financial
agent is to transfer the amount of money that third parties have transferred to his
account as quickly as possible by means of cash or by means of financial transfer
service providers to a foreigner.").
50. Europol, Why is Cash Still King?, supra note 14, at 31.
51. Bundesamt ffir Polizeilfedpol, supra note 11, at 12.
52. Polizei Niedersachsen, supra note 12.
53. Europol, Why is Cash Still King?, supra note 14, at 41.
54. Bundesamt fOr Polizeilfedpol, supra note 11, at 7.
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As already mentioned, it is the transaction-based nature of
money transmitters, in contrast to the client-based nature of banks,
which makes them prone to money laundering. What is more,
according to the FATF, money transmitters "tend to lack the capacity,
experiences and resources to implement AML/CFT requirements."5 5
That is, money remittance companies often are not capable of
monitoring transactions sufficiently. In addition, these companies are
not always trustworthy, as criminals have been reported to undercut
financial transmitters, so that single employees of such a company
could be on a criminal organization's payroll, or even an entire branch
could be run by a criminal organization with the main purpose of
laundering money.56
This Part has reconstructed the reality that is being shaped by
the discourse on the money mule and has shown that this discourse
generates a specific understanding of the practice: the money mule is
normalized as an innocent victim in the West and North, the
criminals behind the mule are complex cybercrime networks from the
East or South, and money is normally laundered by using the service
of a particular type of financial institution, namely money
transmitters. The following Part turns to the discursive means
through which this reality is constructed.
III. HOW THE DISCURSIVE REALITY IS CONSTITUTED (MECHANISMS)
Whereas the previous Part reconstructed the content of the
discourse, this Part is interested in the mechanisms: How exactly
does one come to understand what a money mule is doing? What are
the discursive mechanisms that shape the view of mules, criminals,
financial institutions, and law enforcement? In the following
paragraphs, this Article will point to three discursive means and
show how they operate in the money mule discourse: narrative,
visualization, and metaphor.
A. Narrative
Discourse-oriented scholars in IR have taken a growing interest
in the narrative structure of texts.5 7 Their principle argument is that
55. FINANCIAL ACTIoN TASK FORCE, MONEY LAUNDERING THROUGH MONEY
REMITTANCE AND CURRENCY EXCHANGE PROVIDERS 38 (2010), http://www.fatf-
gafL.org/medialfatflML%20through%2ORemittance%20and%2OCurrency%2OExchange
%20Providers.pdf (last visited June 14, 2017) [https://perma.ce/N8PN-YBQG] (archived
Aug. 28, 2017).
56. Id. at 39.
57. RONALD R. KREBS, NARRATIVE AND THE MAKING OF US NATIONAL SECURITY
(2015); SPENCER, supra note 1; Hedemi Suganami, Narrative Explanation and
International Relations: Back to Basics, 37 MILLENIUM J. OF INT'L STUD. 327 (2008).
[VOL 50:1oo7JOIS
THE MONEYMULE
most texts are organized in the form of narratives, because it is by
telling (and listening to) stories that one makes sense of the world. In
this subpart, the Article will show that this is certainly true for many
of the documents in the discourse on the money mule.
Narrative elements are found in money laundering typology
reports, especially in the examples or case studies presented to
illustrate money laundering techniques.58 However, the stories told in
these reports pale in comparison to the thrilling narratives developed
in the Annual Reports of the Swiss FIU. In these reports, money
laundering comes alive; sometimes they read more like detective
stories than dry law enforcement accounts. Take a look at some of the
titles given to the case-narratives: "Co-worker gone bad-Personal
corruption at company's expense,"59 "A life of luxury at the expense of
policyholders,"60 "Disco fever-Fraud involving fake contractor
invoices,"61 "A misguided pharmaceutical trainee-Illicit trade in
narcotics,"62 and "Blinded by love-Romance scam and money
mule."6 3
Analyzing these case stories in more detail, one can easily see
their narrative structure. The case study "Blinded by love-Romance
scam and money mule,"64 for example, starts out by introducing the
setting: a current account that "did not draw any particular attention
for years until one day several wire transfers were made to a country
in Africa."65 This makes the bank suspicious, and therefore the
bank-obviously the good guy here-investigates. It questions the
account holder called X, the suspicious character in this plot, and X
begins to tell his bank a complicated story of how he fell in love with a
woman Y from abroad, and how he had become acquainted with her
over the Internet. This woman, of course, is the bad character here:
She told the account-holder a story of her deceased father and the
financial problems that resulted from his death, the reason why she
needed money, asked the account-holder to help, and "X was only too
willing to oblige."66 As it turned out, Y had deceived X, the latter
being "[b]linded by love."6 7 A criminal investigation was launched
against X, which was tragic for him as he was more a victim than a
58. E.g., MONEYVAL, supra note 11, at 49-50.
59. MROS, Annual Report by the Money Laundering Reporting Office
Switzerland MROS 2014, FEDERAL OFFICE OF POLICE 41 (2015),
https://www.fedpol.admin.ch/dam/data/fedpol/kriminalitaet/geldwaescherei/jabe/jb-
mros-2014-e.pdf (last visited June 14, 2017) [https://perma.ce/XD54-ET5V] (archived
Aug. 29, 2017) [hereinafter MROS 2014].
60. Id. at 44.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 47.
63. Id. at 48.
64. See id. at 48.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 48.
67. Id. at 48.
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culprit. Yet, the law enforcement authorities did not manage to track
down the woman Y, perhaps because-and this is the narrative's
concluding sentence-she "may not even exist."6 8
Note that here there is a multi-layered narrative, one could call
it a Matryoshka-narrative, entailing several stories. First, the
principle story told by the report, then the story told by X to his bank,
and lastly the story Y told X. Interestingly, the report itself uses the
semantics of narrative-a chart that illustrates the complexity of the
case reads "Story told by Y." 6 9
While it may be surprising to learn that official annual reports
read like detective stories, this is less surprising for the video
material analyzed in preparation of this Article.70 The video recounts
the story of a money mule-the basic ingredients being an innocent
victim, a criminal hiding behind a computer, and the police
successfully investigating the case-so that the money mule can
experience the cathartic moment of realizing what he or she did. The
narrative closes with a direct address to the audience, revealing the
story's moral, namely to be very careful, because if not, anyone may
unwittingly become a money mule.
B. Visualization
As with narratives, discourse studies in IR also led to the
discovery that pictures or images play an important role in the
construction of reality.7 1 Most of what one sees of the world are
representations-the representation of war in the television news, the
representation of terrorist attacks on the front page picture of the
newspaper, the representation of quantitative findings in the charts
of scientific texts, or the representation of the structures of organized
crime in the figures used in books. Such visual representations are
powerful tools of reality construction because they simplify and make
one actually picture what is going on. In the following paragraphs,
the Article will show that visuals play an important role in the money
mule discourse, distinguishing between photographs, stylized
pictures, and abstract figures.
When it comes to photographs, Europol's discourse contributions
stand out, especially its recent "Don't be a Mule" campaign.7 2 On its
website, Europol provides posters and flyers for download that
explain what mules do and how to avoid becoming one. While both
posters and flyers include text, they are dominated by images. In the
68. Id. at 49.
69. Id. at 48.
70. See Polizei Niederachsen, supra note 12.
71. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 377, 380 (explaining that photographic
representations of violence in Darfur manifest global power dichotomies, and influence
how the outside world views the conflict); Hansen, supra note 2, at 268-9.
72. Europol, Money Muling: Public Awareness and Prevention, supra note 12.
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first example, one of altogether four campaign posters, there are
portrait photographs of four people plus a photograph of a handcuffed
hand holding 50 Euro-bills. This ensemble of photographs visualizes
how "innocent victims"7 3 may end up as jailed money mules.




While the above poster makes use of photographs, the other
campaign posters and the flyer use more stylized images, reminiscent
of a comic strip. The flyer below depicts a stereotypical representation
of a cybercriminal sitting in the dark as well as a young man in the
light, whose shadow is a mule. The overall arrangement on the flyer
and the dotted lines are supposed to visualize the connections
between the people involved. Strangely, one then sees the
73. Europol, Money Muling Posters, supra note 16.
74. Id.
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cybercriminal a second time, now holding a board that reads "Acting
as a money mule is illegal."7 5 Cybercriminals as educators? This
seems a rather odd idea and hints at Europol not having worked very
carefully when putting together the poster.
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WHAT CAN YOU DO?
> If you have received suspicious emails, do not
answer them or click on any links
) Check the details of any company that makes
you a job offer (particularly if located overseas)
1 Never provide your bank account details to
anyone unless you know and trust them
) If you think you are involved in a money muling
scame, stop transferring money immediately. Notify
your bnk, the service you used to conduct the
transaction, and your national police
Source: Europol
Figures are also important in the visual representation of the
money mule. Whereas pictures are to be found mostly in campaign
brochures, figures are frequently used in the more technical annual




reports of FIUs and in research reports by international authorities.
Mostly, they illustrate the process of money laundering through
money mules, demonstrating how the different actors involved-here
victims, mules, aggregators, masterminds, and cybercriminals-hang
together. See, for example, a figure from Europol's report "Why is
Cash Still King?,"" which displays the money laundering cycle and

















Another example is a figure found in an annual report of the
Swiss FIU.79 It is interesting not least because it tries to visualize a
rather complex criminal operation, which would be difficult to
understand without such an illustration. The "story told by Y" refers
to the "romance scam" already mentioned in the subpart on narrative:
Europol, Why is Cash Still King?, supra note 14, at 41.
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C. Metaphor
Yet another discursive means of reality construction discussed in
IR is metaphor.8 I Metaphors project the reality of a source domain,
usually from everyday life worlds, onto the target domain (i.e., the
object that is being metaphorized). This way, abstract phenomena are
made accessible, and they can be understood in terms of the everyday
source domain. Hence, theorists of metaphor argue, the analysis of
the principle metaphors employed in a discourse enables one to
discover the understandings attached to the object. The key
metaphors that structure the discourse under study here are the
mule, money laundering, orchestration, and phishing.
The key metaphor, obviously, is the mule. The act of
withdrawing money from one's bank account and bringing it to a
money transmitter to have it sent abroad is thus understood as
something akin to what a mule does: mules, which are horse-donkey
hybrids, are known for their ability to carry heavy loads. Projecting
the animal onto the realm of money laundering thus emphasizes the
physical aspect of carrying cash, of actually taking the money from
the bank and going to the money remittance company. Money mules
in this sense are cash couriers, though they normally do not carry it
across borders, unlike the cash couriers described in the Europol
80. Id. at 48.
81. See, e.g., Rainer Hdisse, Imagine the EU: The Metaphorical Construction of
a Supra-Nationalist Identity, 9 J. OF INT'L REL. AND DEV. 396; HuIsse & Spencer, supra
note 3.
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report on cash referred to above.82 That money laundering involves a
simple act like carrying cash from A to B is something understood
through the use of the money mule metaphor. Apart from that, the
mule metaphor frames the money laundering person as a passive
agent, directed by others. One would hardly say that a mule has
much agency. It may have ideas of its own, but it ends up doing
exactly what its owner tells it do. Nor would one assume that the
mule knows what it is carrying; it neither cares about nor is able to
understand the load on its back. In this sense, the metaphor, too,
constitutes the money mule as an innocent victim, which, as already
seen, is one of the principle frames applied.
While the mule is the discourse's central metaphor, one
encounters many other metaphors in the various reports and
documents. The discourse on the money mule is embedded into the
wider discourse on money laundering, and the money laundering
metaphor also makes frequent appearances in the money mule
discourse. I have analyzed the money laundering metaphor
elsewhere,8 3 but suffice it to say in this context that it applies
dichotomies of clean/dirty to the field, interpreting the act of money
laundering as a transformation of something dirty into something
clean. This, I have argued before, attaches a rather positive meaning
to the act, which possibly makes it difficult to convince the audience
of money laundering actually being something bad. This puts the
mule, too, in a positive light, as it helps with cleaning up.
Other metaphors frequently employed in the money mule
discourse include orchestration and phishing. Orchestration is used to
describe how criminal organizations direct different mules and thus
to point out that the entire process is highly organized and carefully
planned.84 Do not, the orchestration metaphor warns, underestimate
the sophistication of money laundering through money mules, as the
latter do not simply launder the money of some petty crime, but of
organized crime.
Finally, the term phishing, a neologism and also a metaphor, is
used to describe the cybercriminal act of obtaining sensitive
information on people's bank accounts, passwords, credit card details,
etc., in order to transfer money from these accounts to accounts
controlled by the criminal.8 5 This is widely described as the main
predicate offense to money laundering by money mules, and it
compares what cybercriminals do to fishing: cybercriminals like
82. Europol, Why is Cash Still King?, supra note 14, at 19.
83. See generally Rainer Hillsse, In Paradise: Metaphors of Money-Laundering
Brighten Up the Dark Side of Globalization, in METAPHORS OF GLOBALIZATION:
MIRRORS, MAGICIANS AND MUTINIES 98 (Markus Kornprobst et al. eds., 2008).
84. See, e.g., Europol, Why is Cash Still King?, supra note 14, at 33 (describing
Chinese money laundering efforts as "carefully orchestrated transactions").
85. See id. at 18 (describing role of money mules in phishing attacks and other
cybercrimes).
20r7] THE MONEY MULE 1o25
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL JAW
fishermen use baits in order to catch fish.8 6 Again, this possibly
contributes to playing down the crime: fishing is not something
particulary bad, and therefore neither is laundering. Hence the use of
the phishing metaphor trivializes the criminal act.
This Part has shown how three different discursive mechanisms,
namely narratives, visualizations, and metaphors, shape the reality
of the money mule. In the following Part, the Article takes the
analysis one step further by reflecting on the general implications of
these constructions and their specific implications for policy
development.
IV. WHAT FOLLOWS FROM ALL THAT? (IMPLICATIONS)
In the previous Parts, the Article inquired into the discursive
making of the money mule reality. The money mule, it could be said,
was the dependent variable. In this Part, the money mule turns into
the independent variable as this Article focuses on the implications
and on the constitutive effect these constructions have: What are the
consequences when the money mule is constituted as an "innocent
victim?" What are the implications when one views the money
transmitter company as all but an accomplice of money mules? And
what are the consequences when one sees the money mule as being
run by organized crime syndicates from Russia, Ukraine, or Nigeria?
A. Educating Citizens, Rather Than Punishing Them
The money mule, according to the discourse, is an innocent
victim rather than an actual criminal. The dominant construction
conceives of the mule as unaware of having committed a crime, as he
or she is tricked by the criminals' fake-job offer, for example, and
believes that what he or she does is "just a job." This subpart
discusses two implications of this understanding of the money mule.
First, understanding the money mule to be an innocent victim
largely precludes going after the mule with tough measures. Rather,
this understanding of the mule normalizes a soft handling of detected
money mules. And this is in fact what happens, according to the
reports of the Swiss FIU, which describe how most money mules get
away with no or only small penalties because of the difficulty of
proving that a mule is aware of the crime.8 7 If the mule is understood
as a victim rather than a culprit, then the task is not so much one of
punishing, but of helping him/her, and as a preventive measure, to
86. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 55, at 24 (describing a
typical criminal money-remittance scheme and stating that such a scheme is usually
used to launder money originating from phishing).
87. See, e.g., MROS 2015, supra note 23, at 49.
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help the ordinary citizen not to fall prey to the money laundering
criminals. This is the rationale behind information campaigns like
the one Europol launched in March 2016: they seek to educate the
public and raise awareness of the money mule threat. And they do so
by providing concrete information on how to detect a job scam, for
example.8 8
Second, if sovereigns react to the danger of their citizens
becoming money mules by educating them, this has implications for
the citizens. The information campaigns by Europol and others give
clear advice on how to behave, for example, by warning citizens never
to give away confidential account information, etc. Hence the
sovereign is not taking full responsibility for ruling out money
laundering through money mules. Rather, the sovereign insists that
every citizen is responsible for his or her deeds and therefore needs to
be alert. In the Foucault-inspired IR literature, such sovereign
conduct is known as "responsibilization," a technology of governance
at a distance, which is typical for our current governmentality.89
Rather than telling their subordinates what to do and threatening
them with sanctions should they not follow their instructions,
sovereigns, at least according to students of governmentality,
increasingly rely on smarter means of shaping their citizens'
behavior, "responsibilization" being one such means. It is the citizens'
responsibility to behave carefully when online and to keep in mind
the behavioral guidelines published by the authorities. If they do not,
they will be held responsible for the consequences.
Summing up, the "victimization" of the money mule enables a
policy response characterized by education and awareness-raising
rather than by discipline and punishment. The implication of a policy
that tries to solve the money mule problem by educating citizens, is a
shift of responsibility from the sovereign to its citizens.
B. Being Hard on Money Transmitters, Not on Banks
As shown above, the money mule discourse singles out money
remittance companies as the type of financial institution most
vulnerable to misuse by criminals, to the extent that the money mule
and the money transmitter seem to be a natural match. In the case
study narratives of FIUs, mules regularly use the services of Western
Union, and the FATF dedicates an entire report to money
transmitters (and currency exchange providers).90 Banks, in contrast,
88. See Europol, Money Muling: Public Awareness and Prevention, supra note
12.
89. See Oded Lbwenheim, The Responsibility to Responsibilize: Foreign Offices
and the Issuing of Travel Warnings, 1 INT'L POL. Soc. 203, 214-15 (2007); Ole Jacob
Sending & Iver B. Neumann, Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States,
and Power, 50 INT'L STUD. Q. 651, 657-8 (2006).
90. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 55.
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do not figure very prominently in the money mule discourse;
apparently banks are not used much by money mules. Hence what
one sees is the construction of a binary opposition: banks/money
transmitters, the former positively and the latter negatively
connoted.
This binary opposition is particularly curious when it emanates
from reports of the Swiss FIU, considering that Swiss banks like UBS
and Credit Suisse have been involved in several major money
laundering cases. Even with a focus only on money laundering
through mules, it seems like a questionable construction. In the first
stage of laundering through money mules, banks certainly do play a
role, as cybercriminals steal money from bank accounts of their
victims by transferring this money to the bank accounts of their
mules. The mules then withdraw the money from the bank and bring
it to a money remittance company like Western Union. Hence, it
certainly would be possible to also discuss the role of banks with
respect to money mules and for the authorities to think of measures
that would make it difficult for cybercriminals and mules to use bank
accounts. And yet, the discourse puts a strong focus on money
transmitters; they are constituted as the "bad guys" when it comes to
money laundering through money mules. The money mule discourse
"problematizes" money transmitter companies. With a view to the IR
theory of securitization,9 1 one could even argue that money
transmitters are being "securitized" (i.e., declared to be a security
risk).9 2 This enables anti-money laundering policies which aim at
better controlling the business of money transmitters, while at the
same time making it less likely that the authorities go after banks
when trying to solve the problem of money mules.
What is more, the delegitimizing effect the money mule discourse
has on money transmitters extends to the people using their services,
too. Money transmitters are mostly used by migrants who send
money earned in countries of the North and West to their families
back home in the South and East. With the problematization and
securitization of the companies through which migrants transfer
their money, the migrants, too, become suspicious.9 3 Is it really clean
money a migrant or refugee hands over to a Western Union agent, or
could it be that he or she is a money mule helping to clean dirty
money by sending it to a Nigerian criminal network? And indeed, this
implication of the "securitization" of money transmitters and, in
consequence, also of the migrant, is already being observed on the
91. See generally Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis
(1998).
92. See William Vicek, Securitizing Money to Counter Terrorist Finance: Some
Unintended Consequences for Developing Economies, 16 INT'L STUD. PERSP. 406, 414-
16 (2015).
93. Id. at 415.
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ground, as it translates into concrete policies. The German police are
planning money mule information campaigns which are tailor-made
for refugees, because they are considered to be particularly
vulnerable to becoming money mules.94
In sum, an important implication of the money mule discourse is
the delegitimization of money transmitters and a general suspicion
with regards to their clients. This ideational effect may have material
consequences, too, as it enables authorities to take a tough stance on
money transmitters, but not on banks.
C. Blaming Other Countries, Rather Than Oneself
Part II showed that the discourse on money mules makes a
distinction between the money mule and the criminal with respect to
their respective countries of origin: Whereas money mules are
typically located in countries in the North or West, the criminals are
from countries in the South or East. Combined with the construction
of the mule as an "innocent" victim, this amounts to another binary
opposition with the innocent, thus positively connoted North and
West as opposed to the criminal, thus negatively connoted South and
East.
What are the implications of such a construction? Basically, the
expectation is similar to the one in the previous section: It reinforces
anti-money laundering activities' focus on the perpetrators from the
South and the East. Countries like Nigeria and Ukraine are similar
to Western Union and MoneyGram in that they are linked to money
mules. Like the latter financial institutions, the former countries
enable money laundering by mules due to a lack of capacity to rule
out the practice, but also due to a lack of political will. In this sense,
Eastern European and Western African countries are constituted as
tolerant of criminal networks, if not even as outright accomplices of
the criminals. This construction enables the fight against money
laundering to concentrate on these countries, as it establishes a
particular understanding of the problem: Whether money laundering
by mules can be ruled out, very much depends on Eastern European
and Western African countries' behavior.
Again, this is a questionable construction. While it may certainly
be true that countries in West Africa and Eastern Europe lack
adequate anti-money laundering measures, the anti-money
laundering record of countries in the North and West is not above
reproach, either. Take a recent ranking on anti-money laundering by
the Basel Institute, in which Switzerland, for example, only takes a
mid-range place, between Malaysia and the Senegal.95 Seen in this
94. See HEILMANN, supra note 17.
95. BASEL INST. ON GOVERNANCE, BASEL AMIL INDEX 2016 7, 9 (2016),
https://index.baselgovernance.org/sites/index/documents/Basel-AML IndexReport_20
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light, the money mule discourse seems to tie in nicely with the
discourse on money laundering generally, where "money laundering
havens" in the South and East seem to get the majority of the blame.
Although there are well-known "pockets of secrecy"96 in the North
and West, like the state of Delaware or the Channel Islands for
example, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland
point their fingers to Nigeria, Russia, Panama, or Vanuatu. Thus
they shift the blame to countries in the South and the East, and they
divert international attention to these places. Or, to put it differently,
the binary opposition of North-West/South-East established in the
money mule discourse enables international policies that clean up the
laundry, but only the laundries in the South and the East.
An explicit connection to the conference theme sums up this
point: The money mule discourse constitutes sovereigns like Nigeria
or Ukraine as being at the margins of the law, here international
anti-money laundering provisions. No evidence in the discourse could
be found showing that these sovereigns are perpetrating money
laundering themselves. However, what one can see is that these
sovereigns are characterized as enabling cybercriminals to commit
their crimes and then enjoying the monetary fruits of the
cybercriminals' work. Hence sovereign conduct is constituted as a
serious problem indeed, but certainly not the conduct of Western
sovereigns. Rather than questioning its own conduct, the West shifts
the blame and points to sovereigns it almost habitually suspects to
act "on the margins of the law."97
V. CONCLUSION
This Article is an attempt to make sense of the money mule
discourse, as shaped by authorities in the OECD world. In a first
step, the Article reconstructed how the discourse constitutes the key
figures involved, showing that the money mule is mostly seen as an
innocent victim of criminal organizations from Ukraine and Nigeria,
helped by the services of money remittance companies such as
Western Union. In a second step, the Article analyzed the discursive
means which produce this very reality of the money mule, arguing
that narratives, visualizations, and metaphors play a crucial role.
Against this background, in a third step the Article inquired into the
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implications of these reality constructions, claiming that the money
mule discourse enables certains kinds of policy reactions, while
precluding others. Hence one sees policies such as awareness-raising
campaigns by the police, and one sees sovereigns in the OECD
holding countries like Ukraine and Nigeria and companies like
Western Union responsible for enabling mules to launder money.
Alternative policies are difficult to think of, because the dominant
discourse on the money mule does not allow for different realities
which would bring about such alternatives.
As for a conclusion, let me reflect on a puzzle I stumbled across
while writing this Article: From my earlier research on money
laundering I knew that money launderers use highly sophisticated
techniques and complex financial instruments to disguise their
actions. FATF, for example, emphasizes that one of the difficulties
with fighting money laundering is that the criminals always seem to
be one step ahead. On its website FATF declares: "The methods used
to launder proceeds of criminal activities and finance illicit activities
are in constant evolution: as the international financial sector
implements the FATF standards, criminals must find alternative
channels."9 8 Their laundering techniques are highly innovative and
are therefore difficult to anticipate and detect by law enforcement.9 9
However, one can hardly say that laundering by using money mules
is an elaborate method. In fact, having someone to physically carry
cash from the bank to the money transmitter seems to be a fairly old-
school method of breaking the paper trail. And still, organizations
like Europol but also FIUs like the Swiss MROS dedicate
considerable attention to the money mule. Why is that? Is it that
money laundering by mules really is an important yet
underestimated method? Or do Europol and MROS exaggerate the
threat of money mules? And if so, what is the reason for
exaggerating?
It is difficult to find exact numbers on the significance of the
money mule, yet the limited data there is indicates that money mules
are responsible for approximately 10 percent of all suspicious
transaction reports and hence, as a shortcut, for the total amount of
laundered money. For example, in 2014 in Switzerland 8 percent of
all money laundering verdicts relate to phishing as the predicate
offense. And the authorities write that in most cases the phishing
money is laundered through money mules.1 00 In Germany in 2015, 9
percent of all suspicious transaction reports were related to money
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mules, a number that has experienced a strong decline since 2011,
when 31 percent of all reports were due to money mules.0 1 While it is
difficult to judge whether 10 percent makes for an important problem
or not, the conclusion one can draw from these numbers is that the
money mule is less important today than it was five years ago-its
relative importance is in decline. Against this background the
Europol campaign "Don't be a mule," launched in March 2016, seems
to be something of a latecomer.0 2
And yet, it is not surprising that the money mule figures
prominently in the anti-money laundering discourse. The money
mule, after all, makes for a good symbol of money laundering.
Whereas it is difficult for the ordinary citizen to understand what
exactly is going on when money is being laundered with derivatives,
for example, it is much easier to understand what a money mule is
doing. The gripping narratives, telling visualizations, and
comprehensible metaphors all contribute to one having a clear and
vivid idea of how laundering through mules works. There is nothing
like this with respect to other forms of money laundering, except
perhaps for the cross-border cash courrier, a close relative of the
money mule that also makes for good pictures and is thus easy to
grasp.
While this Article does not go as far as arguing that law
enforcement agencies pay considerable attention to money mules
because this is the laundering technique they best understand, from a
sociological institutionalism standpoint, law enforcement, too,
depends on a certain degree of public support. If law enforcement
authorities can show that they dedicate considerable resources to a
problem the public does understand and recognize to be of
importance, then this gives legitimacy to the authorities. Put
differently, Europol puts its focus on the money mule less because it
is so great a problem, but more because it is can be constituted
relatively easily as a problem the audience understands and in result
wants Europol to address. Hence, it is not least because it can be
narrated well that the money mule is targeted by anti-money
laundering authorities.
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